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Once upon a time a boy and his gang drew a big 
circle around themselves and defied anyone else to get 
in it. A clever fellow, the leader drew the line just large 
enough to include all those like him but just small 
enough to exclude everybody else. The outsiders 
initially paid little attention to the rascals, leuing them 
have their fun. But before long, the boys' temper had 
worsened considerably, and soon everyone on the beach 
was silting up. What they saw was not preuy: the boys 
grimly ordering everyone else about and slowly kindling 
a bonfire in their barbecue pit. 
The outsiders' responses varied. Some tried 
discreetly to step over the line, pretending they had been 
in all along. (This strategy met with mixed success, 
depending upon how much the marginal types already 
resembled the fellows.) Others tried various forms of 
surreptitious gerrymandering, furtively anaching a little 
blip here, an appendix there, so as to include them and 
theirs in the circle. (This ploy almost always failed, 
the eagle-eyed gang being obsessed with its borders.) 
In general, outsiders stayed outsiders. 
But the boys had a problem of their own: They could 
nOl uniformly agree about who was in and who was 
oul. So just when things seemed to be turning most 
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ngly, the whole menace collapsed from within. One of 
the boys grabbed the leader's stick and drew a tighter, 
more conservative, line inside the first one. Then 
another seized it and reduced the circumference even 
more. The boys came to words, and then to pointing 
and shoving. Which one of these lines was the real 
one? What kind of line is it that lets him in? 
The internal feuding spelled the end of the boys' 
frightening game because you cannot keep people out 
if you do not know who is in. But it had another 
unexpected effect As the insiders separated into 
warring factions, the outsiders drew strangely together, 
for the demise of the boys' party opened up a vast new 
range of activities on the beach. Before long there was 
all sorts of merry-making: swimming, sunbathing, 
castle making, dog walking, windsurfing, ice cream 
eating, kite flying. They all found something they liked 
doing, and even the boys began to drop their sticks, 
leave off their fuming, and join the fun. 
The moral of the story is this: The end of line-
drawing means the beginning of cooperative life. 
In previous work, R. G. Frey has argued that the 
possession of "moral rights" is not the line separating 
us from nonhuman animals. His reason is nOl thal 
some animals are inside this line (he denies that any 
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are), nor that some humans are outside it (he affinns 
that many are), but rather that the line itself is too fuzzy.l 
Talk about moral rights, Frey explains, is unsupported 
by good arguments and is more successful as rhetoric 
than as philosophy? Frey is a utilitarian who puts little 
stock in general in the Kantian picture of morality, and 
so he rejects the "moral rights" line. 
He does not reject line-drawing. In a recent article, 
"Autonomy and the Value ofAnimal Life," he lays down 
what he believes is a clearer boundary than any other 
current candidate: autonomy.3 According to Frey, 
nonhumans lack moral standing not because they lack 
what no one probably possesses (rights) but, rather, 
because they lack what all "normal adult humans" 
possess: autonomy, the ability to control or make 
something out of our lives.4 
Why should Frey want to shift the burden of the case 
against animals onto the back of a concept traditionally 
associated in the most intimate way with that of moral 
rights? Because he finds it a far less ambiguous notion, 
not to mention a less controversial one. In the first 
sentence of the article he claims that autonomy has had 
"great stress" placed upon it: "in Anglo-American 
society, [by] virtually every moral theory of any note."5 
Because it has received such stress by so many other 
.theorists dealing with so many other kinds of ethical 
issues, he believes that it may serve as the limiting concept 
for all inquiries into our moral duties toward animals. 
Frey is not alone in focusing attention on this line. 
One of the best known cases/or the moral standing of 
animals-Tom Regan's case-puts as much weight on 
autonomy as Frey's case against animals. Regan's 
strategy if to try to attach a large bubble to Frey's circle 
so as to make insiders not only of homo sapiens but of 
all adult higher mammals. Thus, Regan makes each of 
the following claims: Many animals "have preferences 
and have the ability to initiate action with a view to 
satisfying them;" this constitutes "preference autonomy:" 
and many animals, possessing such autonomy, must 
therefore be granted moral considerability.6 Regan does 
not agree with Frey as to where the line should be drawn, 
but he does agree that autonomy is the border. 
This is not the way for defenders of animals to deal 
with line-drawers. As Frey correctly suggests, Regan's 
tack only underscores the importance of the line, 
contributing that much more heat to the debate about 
where the line"really" is. The better strategy is to keep 
one's distance, sneaking into the midst of the fray from 
time to time to keep everyone honest, but never 
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committing oneself to its ultimate importance. The boys 
should constantly be reminded about thlllline previously 
drawn there, this one so recently and confidently drawn 
here. This tactic will never defeat the boys directly, but 
it will buy valuable time. The idea is so to pester all 
line-drawers with the knowledge of their own ineptness 
that they will eventually get frustrated and abandon the 
enterprise of their own free will. 
Far from helping Regan to help Frey set a new line 
in concrete, I want to sneak in, give their disputed border 
a good scuffling with my feet, and get out. My intent is 
to show that autonomy is virtually useless as a line to 
tell us which beings have and which beings do not have 
moral standing. My thesis is that we must not trust 
autonomy to describe the circle outside of which are 
individuals whom "the way is ... open" to killing and 
eating.7 I should tell you at the start that I do believe 
with Frey that animals are not autonomous. But I also 
believe with Regan and others that we should not kill 
them and eat them or use more of them in scientific 
experiments. How can I believe both? Becauseprecious 
little follows for practical morality from the fact that 
animals lack the ability to plan or control their lives. 
Frey's definition of autonomy is more precise than 
Regan's "preference autonomy." It has three elements, 
the first ofwhich is the freedom to act on our own behalf. 
Autonomy is "our desire to achieve things for 
ourselves," to make "something of oW' lives," the way 
a fledgling philosopher might want to succeed on her 
own rather than trying to ride on her famous husband's 
coattails. To illustrate the point Frey tells ofan academic 
acquaintance who was concerned that his untenured 
wife might not be promoted. The husband suggested 
that he write some publishable papers which she could 
take and revise and then submit to journals as her own. 
The woman was rightly insulted by the idea because 
she did not want to make something of herself by 
deceitfully using her husband's work. She wanted to 
make something of herselfby relying on her own talents 
and powers She wanted to make something of herself. o 
By rebuffing her husband's attempt to intrude, the 
woman showed that she was not subject to control by 
paternalistic outside forces. She was free "of the 
coercive interference of others."g 
The second requirement is freedom from internal 
coercion. In order to pursue the ends we most cherish, 
we must not only gain independence from the desires 
of outsiders, but we must also master our own desires 
as well. "A certain ordering" of life is necessary if an 
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untenured professor is to "put herself in a position to 
be able to produce serious academic work."9 If she 
does not control her minor impulses, she will be pulled 
in so many directions that she will not be able to devote 
herself to the desire she desires most Self-government 
means that we are able to forego certain lower-order 
preferences (e.g., playing in a semi-pro basketball 
league) in order to pursue higher-order desires (e.g., 
making associate professor). Freyan autonomy requires 
"internal" as well as "external" freedom, the ability to 
make higher-order decisions about the relative 
importance of lower-order desires. 
The third requirement is to decide for oneself about 
the kind of life one wants to lead. The professor who 
successfully resists the intrusions ofher husband and who 
successfully controls her less desirable desires may still 
be doing something she has not chosen. Suppose that 
she is working to be associate professor for no other reason 
than than her mother was a professor before her and her 
grandmother before that and she feels, for religious 
reasons drummed into her as a child, that she ought to do 
what her family wants. Frey would not call this woman 
autonomous, because she is not pursuing a career she has 
chosen for herself. She is pursuing a plan of life that has 
been imposed upon her. Notice that she has all of the 
equipment needed to survey a range of possible plans 
and to select one for herself but simply has not used it. 
Instead, she has settled for doing the best she can in what 
she considers "the family's" line ofwork. Freyan autonomy 
requires that we think rationally about the variety of 
conceptions of the good life, deliberately choose one, and 
consistently pursue it 
Frey calls his version of the line "autonomy as 
control." Being in control is important for Frey, as his 
example of a nonautonomous person shows. Imagine 
a successful businessman who longs to be a painter and 
yet continues to spend his energies perfecting his 
father's business. Frey's opinion of such a man is harsh, 
and he thinks many of us will "doubtless" be struck by 
how "weak" the man is. Frey puts the matter 
straightforwardly: "The real charge against this man is 
servility; he has allowed, for whatever reason, others 
to impose their conception of the good life upon him."lo 
Here we see how much weight Frey attaches to the third 
requirement. You are not autonomous: if you have not 
selected a plan of life from a range of options, if you 
have not made up your mind about what you think the 
good life is, and if you have not taken decisive action 
to pursue your conception of the good life. 
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Those who are not autonomous, Frey believes, are 
morally inferior to those who are autonomous. Denying 
that all humans have equal moral value, he asserts that 
the value of someone's life is directly related to its 
quality.u Since he thinks that the quality of the moral 
life of a nonautonomous person is less than the quality, 
of an autonomous person, Frey must also think that we 
would all be betterpersons, morally speaking, ifwe seized 
control of our lives, took matters into our own hands, 
and changed careers to pursue the one we most desire. 
Frey does not address himself to some of the knottier 
questions raised by his analysis. Is autonomy 
intrinsically good or good as a means to another end? 
Frey seems to think that it is good in itself. But can't 
we develop our autonomy at the expense of others? 
Couldn't we strive to become more autonomous in order 
better to exploit others sexually or coerce them into 
unearned business favors? Nor does Frey tell us what 
to think about moral theories in which autonomy has 
not been heavily accented. Such theories may not be 
part of something called "the" tradition of Anglo-
American moral theory, but they are undeniably part of 
the moral practices of Brits and Americans: the Land 
Ethic and environmentalisms; Natural Law, Divine 
Command, and other religiously based theories; 
feminist and pragmatist perspectives; all aretaic theories 
that insist on the multiplicity and irreconcilability of 
the virtues. These theories are not bit players in the 
actual moral lives of those living in Great Britain and 
the United States even if they have been largely ignored 
by most of their moral philosophers. But if few of the 
alternative theories stress autonomy, why should we 
think it "central" or noncontroversial? 
Nor does Frey address in this article the most 
troubling question of all: Even if autonomy were 
demonstrated to be the line separating us from animals, 
would thatjustify killing and eating cows or cementing 
baboon heads into steel sleds and slamming them 
against walls? May we so treat any and every being 
that lacks autonomy? 
However urgent these questions may be, they are 
not the ones Frey sets out to answer in the present essay, 
and I will not pursue them here. Rather, the central 
claim of his paper is that autonomy is a property of the 
"normal adult human" and a necessary feature of the 
good life. It is this claim I wish to contest. Frey could 
mean it in one of two ways. He could intend it as a 
descriptive claim, that all "normal adult humans" just 
are autonomous. This would be an empirical judgment 
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about the kinds of lives led by most people in the world. 
If this were Frey's intent we would have to do some 
social-scientific work to find out whether he was right. 
Lacking the results of such a study and basing my 
response only on my own experience with what appear 
to be "normal adult humans," I must nevertheless say 
that I find this view fantastic. The majority of "normal 
adult humans" I know are far from autonomous in Frey's 
sense, and I shall shortly introduce you to one.12 
But Frey might intend his claim, on the other hand, 
as a normative judgment-that all normal adults should 
be autonomous. This is more properly a philosophical 
judgment, and one with which I disagree. I do not 
believe that autonomous people necessarily live lives 
of higher moral quality than less autonomous folk, and 
the person I will describe below will serve to show why 
I hold this view as well. 
Assume that auLOnomy is, on the whole and all things 
considered, a good of one son or another. In the absence 
of other considerations it is better to have control over 
your life than not LO do; better to have a life plan than 
not to have one; better LO be internally free than to be 
tied up by your lesser desires, better to be externally 
free than to be hamstrung by others' plans for you.13 
. Assume further that "the value of life is a function of 
its quality, its quality a function of its richness, and its 
richness a function of its scope or potentiality for 
enrichment."14 And assume too "that many humans 
lead lives of a very much lower quality than ordinary 
normal lives, lives which lack enrichment and where 
the potentialities for enrichment are severely truncated 
or absent."15 From these premises it does not follow, 
as Frey seems to assume, that beings who are not fully 
autonomous are beings who either lack moral standing 
altogether or who would have a higher quality of life if 
they exercised more control over it. 
To see the fallacy of the conclusion consider a 
normal adult human who lives a life of high moral 
quality but has never formulated a plan of life. Carrie 
is a fony-seven-year-old mother of six who not only 
can "read, do higher mathematics, build a bookcase, 
[and) make baba ghanoush," but who also has served 
in a responsible position as secretary of an elementary 
school for twenty-five years. 16 According to the 
school's principal, students refer to Carrie as "Mom" 
because she loves to serve as a surrogate parent to 
homesick, confused, and lost kindergartners. She is 
not hesitant to leave her typewriter to put her arm around 
a distraught five-year-old, laking her into the faculty 
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lounge for a Kleenex and a doughnut. Graced with 
superior counselling skills, Carrie is an excellent conflict 
mediator who quietly but effectively intervenes between 
faculty and administrators, smoothing out school life 
in ways that are no less significant for being nigh 
imperceptible. Here is a moral exemplar who 
successfully raised her children and then turned her 
considerable nurturing skills to those with whom she 
comes in daily contact. 
Carrie likes herjob and is good at it Over the years 
she has developed the skills of an administrative 
assistant and (while she is still paid secretarial wages) 
is indispensable to the operation of her institution. 
Carrie not only knows how to facilitate relationships 
between cranky teachers, but also how to teach them to 
load up Lotus and Word Perfect, how to enter, compose, 
and print the annual budget, and how to finesse travel 
reimbursements through the school district office for 
administrators who consistently forget their receipts. 
But Carrie did not choose her career as a secretary, 
her career as a mother, or her self-sacrificial way of 
life. While she finds some measure of fulftllment in 
being a secretary, she would rather volunteer her time o 
at the local hospital, perhaps even be a nurse, than 
continue to put up with the inevitable recurring conflicts 
at school. She hesitates to quit her job, however, 
because she fears leaving a position which offers her 
seniority, a measure of self-fulfillment, and reasonably 
happy working conditions. Moreover, she does not 
really know how she would go about "changing careers" 
at this point, and she believes (almost certainly in error) 
that her husband and middle-aged children are not in a 
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position to afford her that luxury. Above all else, Carrie 
wants her children to be happy and her husband 
satisfied. Her perception of their needs is more 
important to her than her other career desires. 
Mothering is the activity that gives Carrie the most 
satisfaction. But is this a deliberately chosen higher-
order preference? Surely it is for some women, but 
this does not seem to be the right way to describe Carrie. 
Carrie is a reflective and skilled person who has shaped 
the lives of others in profound ways. But, as she says 
herself, her satisfaction in mothering is more instinctual 
than chosen. Raised in a rural area by conservative 
Catholic parents, Carrie's mothering conception of a 
good life is more an inherited one than one she has 
deliberately chosen from a menu. She never remembers 
having thought about, much less deliberately chosen, a 
"plan" of life. 
Not only does Carrie fail Frey's three-fold criterion 
for being in the autonomy circle, she does not even want 
to try to get in. Carrie has paid careful attention to the 
cultural conditions in which her children were raised, 
and she is not at all certain that she approves. She has 
known for a long time how strongly they were 
encouraged from kindergarten on to "find themselves," 
to exhibit independence of thought, to formulate a 
rational liCe plan, to seek equality with others, to pursue 
their own happiness. Sometimes she finds this amusing, 
because when she was growing up, "you didn't have 
all this agonizing over who you were and where your 
'relationships' were going-you just tound a man, felI 
in love, and got married." But other times she is 
profoundly disturbed by it. She fears that her children 
have been coerced by their consumeristic culture into 
placing an overweening importance on their own 
successes, their own achievements. Being happy is their 
boLLom line. When Carrie was growing up, that was 
not the boLLom line; it was caring for others. By allowing 
her children to chase autonomy has she also let them 
lose sight of the value most cherished by her mother? 
Sara Ruddick offers a perceptive comment that 
illuminates Carrie's concern. Ruddick's observation 
also helps to explain why Carrie does not think she 
would necessarily be a beLLer person if only she were 
more independent: 
Because [mothersJ live through and witness 
shifting power relations, because they watch 
firsthand the anxieties of children driven to 
be equal, mothers would be slow to wish upon 
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themselves or anyone they care for the fearful 
pursuit of equality. In the maternal view of 
conflict, it is not necessary to be equal in order 
to resist violence. 17 
In Carrie's conception of the good life, resisting violence 
while nurturing peace is more important than resisting 
others while nurturing independence. Again, Ruddick 
helps us to understand the specificity of this kind of 
life: "The peacemaker asks of herself and those she 
cares for, not what they can afford to give up, but what 
they can give; not how they can be left alone, but what 
they can do together."18 
So that you do not misunderstand me, let me add 
immediately that Carrie is not the sort of "intensely 
sympathetic," "intensely charming," Victorian woman 
described by Virginia Woolf in Women and Writing: 
She excelled in the difficult arts of family life. 
She sacrificed herself daily. If there was 
chicken, she took the leg, if there was a draught 
she sat in it-in short, she was so constituted 
that she never had a mind or wish of her own, 
but preferred to sympathise always with the 
minds and wishes of others."19 
Just as Woolf had to "kiIl" this "Angel in the 
House"-herself-before she could write, so Carrie had 
to kiIl the "Mother in the Home" before she could go 
out into the workplace with her youngest child still not 
in schooI.2o Carrie is not in the category of self-abasing 
religious housewives, nor even in the category Diana 
T. Meyers describes as "the traditional women."21 She 
is a fulI moral agent with immense talents in the areas 
of care, compassion, hospitality, fairness, discernment, 
responsibility, loyalty, and love, She exhibits, in short, 
an extremely high quality of moral life. Notice that 
she is by no means a "less" rather than "more" nonnal 
human, much less a marginal one. We are not talking 
here about someone who has severe brain damage or is 
seriously mentally-enfeebled. We are not talking about 
a criminal, a ne'er-do-well, or even an apathetic, 
chocoholic soap opera addict. Carrie is as nonnal a 
human as you can find. If she has any distinction, it is 
only that she is such a good person. Nevertheless, she 
has not selected a plan of life from a range of options; 
she has not made up her own mind about what the good 
life is; and she has not taken decisive action to pursue 
her conception of the good life. 
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Carrie is a reflective, nonautonomous, saint. She 
does not have control over her life and, moreover, she 
is incapable of exercising control over her life. And 
yet the quality of her life is extremely high. Here is a 
woman who falls outside of Frey's circle. 
To get a clearer picture of the type of individual I 
have in mind, consider four different types of saints.22 
A saint is anyone who lives a self-sacrificial life. A 
self-sacrificial life is one that consistently promotes the 
legitimate interests of others while occasionally acting 
contrary to legitimate interests of the self: Strongly 
autonomous saints act self-sacrificially because they 
want to act self-sacrificially. Mother Teresa ofCalcutta 
not only has the ability to reflect critically on her desires 
but also the freedom of will to change her way of life if 
she decides, one morning, to leave the poor and get 
into advertising. Weakly autonomous saints act self-
sacrificially because they want to act self-sacrificially. 
Unlike the strong autonomous saint who energetically 
affirms and reaffirms her way oflife, however, this saint 
is attracted to other conceptions of the good life. She is 
unable to switch directions because she lacks the 
willpower to act on her other desires. She continues to 
act self-sacrificially, but this is as much because of 
weakness of will as anything else. Both of these saints 
fit Frey's depiction of what he calls normal adult 
humans. Both are autonomous. And the weakly 
autonomous saint would be better off if she were to 
take more control over her life. 
Now consider two nonautonomous saints. The 
strongly nonautonomous saint acts wantonly in a self-
sacrificial way. Like Felicite in Flaubert's short story, 
"Un Simple Coeur," this saint's operative desire is 
always to relieve the suffering of others, but the desire 
to relieve suffering is not a desire she has chosen. What 
is more, this is not a desire she could choose, because 
nature and nurture have conspired against her to produce 
a person who lacks freedom of will. In Harry 
Frankfurt's apt expression, she "neither has the [will 
she] wants nor has a will that differs from the will [she] 
wants."23 Driven by psychological and sociological 
forces beyond her control, Felicite just happens to be a 
saint rather than a sinner. 
Weakly nonaulonomous saints, like strongly 
nonautonomous saints, do not have the power to 
choose their self-sacrificial way of life. Their 
operative desires are out of their control, determined 
by powerful forces of behavioral make-up, habit, and 
socialization. Unlike the strongly nonautonomous 
saint, however, this person is conscious of the forces 
shaping her and is capable of reflecting on her desires. 
She is sometimes disposed, like Carrie, to want a 
different way of life. Unfortunately, she lacks the 
willpower to act on these desires. Like the weakly 
autonomous saint, the weakly nonautonomous saint 
is not always happy with the fact that she is a saint 
instead of an advertising executive. 
Carrie is a reflective, weakly nonautonomous, saint. 
Her will is not free. Yet she is a powerful woman, having 
shaped the lives of those around her in profound and 
lasting ways. Her children, her students, her husband, 
her brothers and sisters, her colleagues at work-all 
will tell you how dramatic Carrie's influence has been. 
Carrie may be nonautonomous, but she nevertheless 
exercises tremendous power over others, and she does 
it for their good. 
I want to make it clear that when I deny that women 
like Felicite and Carrie have autonomy I am not denying 
that so-called "traditional" women have autonomy. As 
Meyers rightly points out, "the claim that feminine 
socialization altogether excludes most women from the 
class of autonomous agents is both morally repugnant 
and factually unsubstantiated."24 I am not claiming 
anything like the repugnant thesis that women are not 
autonomous. I am claiming only that some women, 
like some men, lack autonomy, and that lacking 
autonomy constitutes no reason to downgrade a person's 
value. The problem here is that we are trained to 
interpret "nonautonomy" as a negative judgment about 
someone's character when autonomy, in this context, 
should be a descriptive rather than a normative term. 
No one would accept a definition of autonomy 
according to which they did not qualify as autonomous. 
But if no one falls outside our definition, then the 
definition is useless. In calling a person nonautonomous, . 
we must keep it firmly in mind that we intend, prima 
facie, no negative comment about that person. 
So I repeat. Carrie is a weakly autonomous saint. 
But if Frey is right that the way is open to killing and 
eating non autonomous beings, then we would be 
justified in killing and eating Carrie. But that is absurd. 
Frey might try to save his thesis by denying one of 
three things about Carrie. He might try to deny that 
she is a normal adult human. By putting her in the 
class of severely brain-damaged infants-and cows-
he could simply assert that I have not chosen a typical 
human being as my example. This response is very 
weak. If Carrie is not a normal adult human then I do 
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not know one. We may safely assume that Frey will 
not try this route of escape. 
More plausibly, Frey could try to deny that Carrie 
lives a life of high moral quality.25 Such an argument 
might go as follows. While Carrie has many wonderful 
qualities and is certainly a normal human, her life would 
nonetheless be better, morally speaking, if she were to 
exercise more of her autonomy. By leaving her 
secretarial job and becoming a nurse she could continue 
to exercise her mothering and nurturing skills but in an 
environment she had chosen herself. On this 
interpretation, Carrie would not qualify as a counter-
example of Frey's view at all. Instead, she would serve 
to reinforce the importance of autonomy as a measure 
of morality, being one more example of the truth of the 
claim that a life with less autonomy is of lower quality 
than a life with more of it. 
But this response begs the question. We could only 
determine that Carrie's life was inferior because it was 
nonautonomous if we already knew that a nonauton-
omous life was by definition inferior. Whether one can 
have a good life and be nonautonomous is precisely 
the question we have set out to answer, and we cannot 
answer it by repeating it as an assertion. 
But there is another way that Frey could press the 
objection. He might begin by admitting that Carrie's 
life is a good one, and that she is not independent, but 
then go on to claim that her life would nevertheless be 
a better one if she were to become autonomous. This 
response is stronger, but it gives away the store by 
granting my central point: Nonautonomy is compatible 
with the good life. So if this is the escape route Frey 
chooses, I shall respond by putting the ball right back 
into his court, with some English on it: Nonautonomy 
is not only compatible with a high quality of moral life, 
but further, autonomy may in some instances diminish 
the quality of a person's life. How so? 
Imagine another secretary, Molly, who is like Carrie 
in every respect except that Molly chose her job as a 
secretary. Twenty-five years ago Molly weighed the 
alternatives, decided on a life plan, ordered her life so 
as to become a secretary, and then conscientiously 
pursued her conception of the good life. Molly's quality 
of life, one can imagine Frey saying, is superior to 
Carrie's simply because Molly chose her line of work 
rather than having it foisted upon her. 
Now, we already know Frey's complaint about 
Carrie. It is the same as his charge against the successful 
businessman: servility. Carrie has allowed others (her 
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husband, her children, her religious relatives) to impose 
their conceptions of the good life upon her. She 
proceeds to live them out. To be sure, she is no slave, 
"but," as Frey says, "we can be servile without being a 
slave." Frey thinks that Carrie, for all of her good traits, 
should throw off these external bonds. She should 
become more Molly-like. 
This is an interesting thought experiment, but it 
makes a couple ofproblematic assumptions. First, how 
free was Molly twenty-five years ago when she made 
her decision? One easily sees behind Molly's choice 
glossy magazine advertisements for Trend Business 
College, the happy voices of secretarial friends, 1950s 
movies about the glamor of big business. In the era of 
behavioristic psychology, we have learned to distrust 
confident assertions such as "I and I alone have chosen 
this line of work over that one." We are sensitive after 
Freud to the power of subconscious forces on rational 
processes, and we no longer are certain that the quality 
of the lives of people who avow that they have chosen 
their conception of the good life is better than the quality 
of those people's lives who-perhaps more candidly-
admit that they probably have not chosen their 
conception of the good life. Self-deception is more 
likely to plague the person who imagines herself 
autonomous than the person who acknowledges that 
she is not. There are good reasons to think that Molly's 
allegedly autonomous choice was not autonomous at all. 
Ofcourse, if this Molly's choice was not autonomous, 
that Molly's choice could have been. So let us now 
consider the Molly who really was making the choice 
for herself. Couldn't Carrie be a better person by 
adopting more of this Molly's assertiveness and 
independence? No, for the following reason. Not all 
of the virtues are necessarily compatible with all of the 
others, and a high degree of personal autonomy and an 
intensely self-sacrificial spirit seem rarely to be found 
in the same character. To put the same point a different 
way, Carrie would no longer be Carrie if the author of 
her story were to give her a Mollyan life plan. 
Frey lTl;ight respond to this claim by denying that 
Carrie's character is so limited; he might even say that 
he knows a servant like Carrie with Molly's self-
assertiveness. I would not believe him and would ask 
him to show us that person. "Showing" here means 
composing a coherent, realistic narrative about a 
dependent-Carrie who exercises Molly-like control. I 
would not deny that there is a possible world in which 
the Molly/Carrie in question might exist, and I can 
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imagine a science fiction writer constructing a character 
who is simultaneously in control and out of control, 
other-directed and self-sacrificial while also self-
directed and self-interested. My point is not that the 
alleged character "Molly/Carrie" violates all laws of 
logic; it is that she violates our laws of psychology. I 
cannot envision Carrie as a character in a realistic novel 
exhibiting Molly's self-assertive individualism. Why? 
Because the literary demands of similitude require a 
considerable amount of consistency. In order to present 
MollylCarrie convincingly, an author would at some 
point have to have Carrie sacrifice the beliefs, practices, 
and values most dear to her. The result would be a 
Molly/Carrie who was no longer Carrie. 
There are psychological limits to the virtues, and not 
all of the virtues are compatible with all of the others. 
Experience suggests to me that among normal adult 
humans-l shall have to be permitted to exclude Mother 
Teresa from my universalization-a high degree of 
autonomy is almost never found in combination with a 
high degree ofsolicitude for others. If Frey were arguing 
that autonomy was necessary for sainthood, I would be 
inclined to agree with him. In the saints, we find that rare 
combination of autonomy and care, but it is precisely the 
extraordinariness of this combination that makes such 
people saints. Normal adult humans like us have more 
difficulty putting lots of autonomy together with lots of 
care for others. Frey argues that autonomy is necessary 
for normal adult humanhood. Carrie is acounterexample. 
So even if we do not dismiss Frey's second imagined 
response as granting the point at issue, it still fails. Carrie's 
moral life would not necessarily be of a higher quality if 
she were to become autonomous. 
There is a third response open to Frey; he could deny 
that Carrie is hot autonomous. If we dig deep enough 
in her story, he might say, we shall see that she really 
has a free will and that her desires are not determined 
by irresistible forces of nature or socialization. Such 
an argument might go as follows. Carrie has her own 
ideas about what the good life is for her, and she is 
pursuing them. She is as free as the autonomous saint 
who obeys God's voice because she wants to obey God's 
voice. Carrie may not have been autonomous in her 
choice of workplaces, but she is autonomous in the 
choice of a self-sacrificial way of life. 
This response is a strong one, but its ultimate failure 
may be seen by considering the following conversation 
in which the philosopher tries to expose Carrie's 
allegedly hidden autonomy. 
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Frey: "Even though you say you are nonautonomous 
because you did not choose your secretarial job, you 
did choose to go to work, and in this you demonstrated 
your autonomy." 
Carrie: "I did not choose to go to work outside the 
home; I had to work to make ends meet." 
Frey: "Well, you chose that, to go to work to make 
ends meet, and you did it because you love your 
family, no?" 
Carrie: "In a sense I chose it But that choice was 
influenced as much by my husband's (unspoken) wish 
that I go to work and by my own perception of my 
family's needs as it was by my own interests. In fact, 
when I think about it, I probably would not have chosen 
to work had I not been very subtly coerced. So I guess 
I should say, no, that! did not choose to work." 
Frey: "But do you agree that you love your family, 
and that you would choose to satisfy their needs and 
your husband's desires above all else?" 
Carrie: "Yes." 
Frey: "Then when you make choices that pursue 
these goals you demonstrate your autonomy." 
Carrie: "That sounds convincing. But isn't 
autonomy the control of lower order desires by higher 
order reflection?" 
Frey: "Yes." 
Carrie: "Then am I really autonomous when I 
'decide' to do what I perceive my husband wants me to 
do and what I feel my family wants me to do? Isn't this 
more like 'acting under the influence of forces outside' 
myself than 'acting so as to make something for myself' 
of myself?" 
Frey: "Do you think it is?" 
Carrie: "Yes, I do. For religious reasons; I would 
rather be subject to these others' desires than to pursue 
my own self-interested ends independently of them. But 
even this way of speaking is foreign to me." 
Frey: "Why?" 
Carrie: "It is not very flattering to me, and it is not 
the way I would put things." 
Frey: "How would you put them?" 
Carrie: "I would not put them in a way that 
suggested that I once faced a stark choice between (a) 
acting to please my husband and family and (b) acting 
to please myself. Nor would I say that I deliberated 
about those two potential life plans and then settled on 
(a). That is a false picture. I never faced the choice, 
nor made such a decision." 
Frey: "Really? Why?" 
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Carrie: "Because I am naturally a person who 
acts on (a) without thinking much about the 
possibility of (b)." 
Frey: "You are 'naturally' such a person? Where 
did you get this nature?" 
Carrie: "I am naturally such a person. I got my 
nature from my conservative rural upbringing, from my 
Bleeding Heart of Jesus Catholic tradition, from my 
parents, from my religious subculture." 
The dialogue gives us insight into a particular 
nonautonomous character, and adds lustre and depth to 
a discussion that has been pale and abstract. It shows 
that someone can be not only good and nonauton-
omous but also intelligent and nonautonomous. 
Nonautonomous? Certainly. Carrie no more chose her 
caring servant-like conception of the good life than she 
chose her parents. 
No matter how deeply we dig beneath the layers of 
influence, no matter how far we go in trying to strip 
away the "outer" layers, we will not find a hidden 
autonomous self who somewhere sometime seized 
control of her life. That self-standing individual is not 
there.26 Both of these descriptions are true: 
1. Carrie is good (that is, she lives a highly textured 
moral life), and 
2. Carrie is nonautonomous (that is, she does not 
have control over her desires). 
Because 2 is true, Carrie falls outside the line Frey 
has drawn. That shows the moml irrelevance of the 
line, not of Carrie.27 
Conclusion 
I started with a fable about boys drawing lines on 
the beach; I hope its relevance to my argument is clear. 
Those of us who place overweening value on 
autonomy make a dangerous and costly mistake. For 
to suggest that the value of any being's life is 
determined by how far that being falls from the middle 
of an arbitrary circle in the sand is to denigrate the 
lives of saintly folk like Carrie. 28 
I do not think that my point will be easy for everyone 
to see. It may be particularly difficult for those who have 
spent their lives talking to autonomous boys on one comer 
of the beach. But neither is crosscultural understanding 
impossible---even across very wide gaps-and to see my 
point we need only open our eyes, forget our prejudices, 
look intently at the foreign form of life, and fix our 
attention on particular individuals within it. Our ways 
of being moral may be incommensurable, but they are 
not impenetrable. 
The problem with Frey's approach is that the moral 
life is so varied; no single standard should be relied 
upon to tell us what is normal and what is not. At best 
we must have a supple moral vocabulary, one equipped 
with a complex and diverse family of notions. Perhaps 
there are some lives utterly lacking in moral value, but 
just because they do not display autonomous control is 
not a good reason to begin wondering whether we may 
barbecue or bash them.29 Nor should we too readily 
ascribe universality to the central virtue of our circles. 
All too often this has the effect of stigmatizing other 
individuals and other circles as aberrant. This should 
no longer be acceptable, even if it is a long-established 
practice. Feminist, religious, and utopian communities 
in the West and East have ways other than Frey's for 
ordering and evaluating life. 3o They may be less 
aggressively individualistic or competitive or power-
conscious; they may place a higher value on 
interdependence or compromise or self-sacrifice. They 
may attach less importance to one's personal future and 
more importance to the collective past. But the mere 
fact that they do not value autonomy as highly as Frey 
and his boys do is no argument that they are therefore 
less admirable morally. 
What Frey has left unsaid-what falls into the 
margins rather than the lines of his text-is the figure 
of his other, the background character out of whom 
Frey's autonomous self has emerged. This other, the 
independent agent's "mother," as it were, is the servant, 
the patient, the one who is subject to forces beyond her 
control. Such forces are powerfully displayed in the 
birthing process required to bring every potentially 
autonomous person into the world. The mother often 
suffers as the child establishes the necessary distance 
from her. But for the child then to tum around and 
accuse the other of moral inferiority associated with 
"servility" and "weakness" is to be more than 
ungrateful. It is culpable misinterpretation, using a 
single standard-a son's independence-to try to 
measure the value of a mother's form of labor.31 
What does Carrie have to do with animals? She is a 
vivid reminder of how different we humans are from 
each other, of how difficult it is to categorize our kite 
flying, castle building, ice cream eating carnival using 
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simple schemes like "in" and "out." If our fluid 
relationships with each other do not yield to such 
simplistic categories, how much more ill-suited such 
categories must be for describing the complex web of 
our relations to animals. 
Philosophers have long sought to find a single 
characteristic the possession of which would set us 
clearly above other animals. Previously we have tried 
to draw the line at the possession of a soul, or at 
sentience, or purposiveness, or desire, belief,linguistic 
competence, imagination, a concept of the self, 
rationality, a sense of the future, or possession of moral 
rights. All of these lines fail because we have such 
different ways of living good lives, as Carrie plainly 
shows. There is no reason to think we may kill and 
barbecue Carrie just because she lacks autonomy. Nor 
is there any reason to think we may kill and barbecue 
cows and pigs just because they lack autonomy. 32 
Research for the article was supported by a Faculty 
Improvement Leave from Iowa State University 
during 1989-1990. 
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Notes 
1 Frey holds that if the possession of moral rights entitles 
one to membership in the moral circle then animals will have 
to be excluded, as will those humans he and we clumsily call 
"marginal." Marginal humans who lack language, beliefs, and 
interests lack the equipment necessary for possessing the right 
to life. Severely handicapped newborns, very severelymentally 
enfeebled adults, those in persistent vegetative states, the 
irreversibly comatose: all will appear-with whales, cows, 
and pigs-on the wrong side of the line. By Frey's reckoning, 
all of these beings lack the equipment necessary for the 
possession of moral rights: language, beliefs, and interests in 
the relevant sense. If they lack the necessary equipment they 
cannot have moral rights. It follows that in killing such beings 
we do not fail to respect their right to life. 
The argument is predicated on the supposition that 
possession of moral rights is necessary for inclusion in the 
circle. Frey rejects the premise. See Interests and Rights: 
The Case AgainstAnimals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 
especially chapters 2 and 3. Frey takes the phrase "marginal 
cases" from Jan Narveson, "Animal Rights," Canadian 
Journal ojPhilosophy 7 (1977): 167. 
2 For his arguments against the acceptability of the notion 
of moral rights, see Interests, pp. 7-17, and Partill (pp. 43·98) 
of Rights, Killing and Suffering: Moral Vegetarianism and 
Applied Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983). For his 
concessions about the usefulness of the notion, see ch. 9 of 
Rights, "Rights, Their Nature, and the Problem of Strength," 
pp.67-82. 
3The Monist 70 (January 1987): 49-63. See, too, the series 
of articles that he describes as forthcoming (and which I have 
not read) for which he gives the following bibliographical 
references: "Autonomy and Animals," inM. Daly,A. George, 
OOs., Animals in Society: Rights and Wrongs; "Autonomy, 
Proxy Agency, and Valuable Lives," in Philosophica; and 
"Conceptions of the Good Life and the Value of a Life," in T. 
Attig, D. Callan, L. W. Sumner, eds., Values and Moral 
Standing. Frey has apparently spent enough energy trying to 
erase the line drawn by rights-based approaches to the treatment 
of animals. The phrase "moral rights" hardly appears in the 
recent article, having been replaced by talk about the "value of 
life," while talk about the "interests" ofbeings has been replaced 
by discussions of their relative "autonomy." 
4 Frey uses the phrase "normal adult humans" in his flIst 
sentence. "Autonomy," p. 50. 
S"Autonomy," p. 50. It is worth noticing that the concept 
of moral rights is also central to the theories he identifies. 
6 Regan, The Casefor AnimalRights (Berkeley: University 
ofCalifomia Press, 1983), pp. 84-85. Cited in Frey, p. 60. 
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7 Frey, p. 51. 
8 "Autonomy," p. 53. 
9 "Autonomy," p. 53. 
10 "Autonomy," p. 54. 
11 Frey writes: "But I do not regard all human life as of 
equal value; I do not accept that a very severely mentally-
enfeebled human or an elderly human fully in the grip ofsenile 
dementia or an infant born with only half a brain has a life 
whose value is equal to that of normal, adult humans. The 
quality of human life can plummet ... . As the quality of 
human life falls, trade-offs between it and other things we 
value become possible ... " "Autonomy," p. 58. 
Two points should be made here. First, from the premise 
that the quality of some people's moral lives is better than 
others it does not follow that the value of some people's lives 
is greater than others. As Paul Taylor argues, beings with 
(what Taylor calls) "inherent moral worth" have it equally, 
even though the richness and texture of their lives differs. 
Second, in order to account for the fact that different kinds of 
beings live different kinds of lives and require different forms 
of respectful treatment from us it is not necessary to say that 
the lives of some of us are greater than those of others. The 
twenty year old Downs syndrome patient should be treated 
more paternalistically than the fully conscious autonomous 
philosopher, but the difference in treatment does not entail 
nor require the postulation of a difference in their respective 
inherent moral worth. Cf. Taylor's Respect for Nature: A 
Theory of Environmenlal Ethics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986). 
Ned Hettinger has patiently explained this point to me. 
The relevant distinction is between moral considerability or 
moral standing (which a being either has or does not have) 
and that of the moral quality of a being's life (which comes in 
degrees and may be graded or ranked). Any being with moral 
considerability has it fully, even if his life is wasting away 
because of Alzheimer's disease. Clearly, even on this 
hierarchical view of better and worse moral lives, a being's 
being located at the bottom of the scale is in itself no reason 
to think that that being may be disrespectfully treated, much 
less killed, eaten, deprived of a family life, or had chemicals 
poured in its eyes. 
12 How many people in the world are like Carrie? I am 
currently reading two realistic novels, Louise Erdrich's The 
Beet Queen (New York: Henry Holt, 1986), and Iris 
Murdoch's The Philosopher's Pupil (New York: Viking, 
1983). Out of a total of TOughly twenty major characters in 
these two contemporary works, I would call all twenty "normal 
adult humans," roughly fifteen of them morally admirable 
people, but only five of them autonomous in Frey's sense. 
This seems a representative assessment of my nonfictional 
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acquaintances as well. If the novels are at all representative 
then, TOughly seventy-five percent of all people are morally 
good, but only a third of those exercise Frey's "autonomy as 
control." If there are five billion people in the world. this 
would mean that some two billion are nonautonomous and 
lead lives of a high moral quality. 
13 In "The Value of Autonomy," The Philosophical 
Quarterly 32 (January 1982): 35-44. Robert Young raises the 
question of whether autonomy is always a virtue. The major 
problem Young sees is that of the tyrant who uses his or her 
autonomy to devise evil schemes. As will become clear, this is 
not my primary objection to the concept. Young touches on 
my concern, however, in his conclusion: " ... what I have said 
'" does not imply that the exercise ofan individual's autonomy 
may not at the same time introduce more disvalue than the 
value that resides in that autonomy" (p. 44). 
14 "Autonomy," p. 57. 
15 "Autonomy," p. 57. 
16 The quotation is from Regan's paper, ''The Case for 
Animal Rights," in Peter Singer, ed., Tn Defence ofAnimals 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), p. 22. Quoted in Frey, 
"Autonomy," p. 59. 
17 "Preservative Love and Military Destruction: 
Reflections on Mothering and Peace," in Mothering: Essays 
in Feminist Theory, ed. Joyce Trebilcot (fotowa: Rowman 
& Allenheld, 1984), p. 253. Quoted in Card, "Women's 
Voices," pp. 133-134. 
18 Ruddick, p. 253. Quoted in Claudia Card, "Women's 
Voices and Ethical Ideals: Must we Mean What We Say?" 
Ethics 99 (October 1988): 134. 
19 (London: The Women's Press, 1979),p.59. Quotedin 
Jean Grimshaw, Philosophy and Feminist Thinking, p. 139. 
20 Carrie regards the deliberate pursuit of her own ends 
independently of the needs and ends of others as something 
she ought not to do. Perhaps this is because she believes that 
such self-interested reflection is sin. Perhaps she thinks that 
it will distract her energies from her children (with whom she 
deeply identifies herself). Perhaps she believes as the British 
novelist Charles Williams did, that some people have the gift 
and responsibility of carrying psychological and spiritual 
burdens for others. Perhaps Carrie believes as Williams and 
Saint Paul did, that her life is not her own to control. "He and 
we co-inhere," Williams wrote, and the New Testament puts 
it even more mysteriously: "I live: yet not I but Christ liveth 
in me." Whatever the explanation, Carrie's hesitance to pursue 
her own independence is not unprecedented. For a 
philosophical defense ofWilliams 'doctrine of Co-Inherence, 
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see Charles Talliaferro, "The Co-Inherence," Christian 
Scholar's Review 18 (June 1989): 333-345. The biblical 
quotation is from Williams, 'The Way of Exchange," in The 
Image ofthe City and Other Essays, ed. Anne Ridler (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1958). Quoted in Talliaferro, p. 334. 
21 "Personal Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine 
Socialization," The Journal of Philosophy 84 (November 
1987): 619-628. Meyers points out that "feminists are 
justifiably suspicious of the professed fulfillment of many 
traditional women. Since traditional women do not use 
autonomy skills adeptly, there is no reason to believe that 
they are doing what they really want to do" (p. 628). To her 
credit, Meyers goes on to point out that "Conversely, however, 
if an adult who has been raised to assume the tasks of 
housekeeping and parenting embraces this role, feminists 
would have no grounds for complaint provided that the 
individual is skilled in autonomy competency" (p. 628). 
Meyers is too enamored of autonomy. As Kathryn Pyne 
Addelson points out in a response to the article, Meyers'liberal 
approach to the lives of traditional women does not, in the end, 
"respect the worlds and lives of many men, women, and 
children, and they leave many of our own secular, white, 
professional biases unexamined .... The fundamentalist mother 
is faulted for accepting creationism uncritically, but we do not 
ask about the schoolteachers' acceptance of Darwin-
evolutionary theory is true, is it not?" Addelson concludes 
that "in one form or another, the specter of elitism re-emerges" 
in Meyers' feminism. I agree. "Autonomy and Respect," The 
Journal ofPhilosophy 84 (November 1987): 629. 
22 In what follows, I am drawing on some ideas of Harry 
Frankfurt's, and a lmggestion of Phil Quinn's. 
23 Harry Frankfurt, ThelmporlanceofWhatWeCareAbout 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press, 1988), p. 21. 
24 Meyers, p. 621. 
25 Nietzsche held that every person who fills the role of a 
servant is necessarily self-deceived and pitiable. I have tried 
to suggest why this judgment does not apply to Carrie. She 
has Iived her life tending to the needs and desires and welfares 
of others: of her children, her husband, her employers, her 
brothers and sisters, their children, her neighbors, but she has 
not done so in an umeflective or grudging way. She has not 
"taken control" of her life or asserted her right to pursue her 
own ends "free of the coercive interference of others," but 
she is aware that she could do so. She flourishes with a 
conception of the good life she inherited. 
26 The language itself requires us to postulate what is not 
there; Descartes' unified subject reading life-options from a 
menu and choosing number 23 over number II. As femimsts 
from Carol Gilligan to Marilyn Friedman have argued, the 
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paradigm is too individualistic to capture the most important 
elements of many women's (and men's!) moral experiences. 
Cf. Gilligan's In a Different Voice: PsycJwlogical Theory 
and Women's Development (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press,1982), and Friedman's "Autonomy and the Split-1.£vel 
Self," Southern Journal ofPhilosophy 24 (1986): 19-35. 
27 Frey couId also argue that Carrie's heteronomous life--
showing care for the needs of others at the potential cost of 
her own independence--is irrational. I cannot here do justice 
to this objection, but it is worth pointing out in passing that a 
number of very rational people have recently come to the 
defense of at least one nonautonomous form of ethics, the 
Divine Command theory. If we assume that philosophers 
who write in mainstream analytic philosophy journals are not 
likely to propose irrational ideas, then the recent proliferation 
of philosophical defenses of this theological ethic provides 
us with some reason not to think that "ethics" is impossible 
without autonomy as a central pillar. See, for example, Philip 
L. Quinn, Divine Commands and Moral Requirements 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); Robert Merrihew Adams, 
"A Modified Divine CommandTheory ofEthical Wrongness," 
in Gene Outka and Iohn P. Reeder, Ir., eds., Religion and 
Morality (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1973); and "Autonomy 
and Theological Ethics," and "Divine Command Metaethics 
Modified Again," both reprinted inAdams, The VU'tueofFaith 
and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York: 
Oxford, 1987), pp. 123-127 and 128-143; Baruch A. Brody, 
"Morality and Religion Reconsidered," in Brody, ed., 
Readings in the Philosophy ofReligion: AnAnalytic App1'O(J£h 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974): 592-603; Ianine 
Marie Idziak, "In Search of 'Good Positive Reasons' for an 
Ethics of Divine Commands: A Catalogue of Arguments," 
Faith and Philosophy 6 (January 1989): 47-64. 
28 Since moral circles and the standards of judging the 
good internal to them are various. it is best to accord each 
human being the same kind of inherent value we attribute to 
ourselves. This is the central insight of Frey's utilitarian 
tradition, that each counts for one and only for one. Because 
we lack a consensus on how to measure the richness of moral 
life, we ought not to make the quality of moral life the basis 
for deciding how to treat one another. We ought to act as if 
each of us possessed equal value, respecting others as if they 
were ends and never mearIS unless we have good reasons for 
thinking that something is not an end. 
29 Further, making such a judgment is so momentous that 
we probably should not even tempt ourselves with it unless 
forced to do so. As Alan Donagan points out in The Theory 
of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1981), 
the capacity ofwestern industrialized nations to support even 
the most vulnerable of humans is great. Until we are so poor 
and resourceless that we must begin killing some humans we 
ought not to worry about drawing lines. 
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30 Where did the idea get started that autonomy is a moral 
idea which all rational persons ought to pursue and a 
constitutive feature of normal adult human life? Perhaps 
it was on an island, where controlling the boats that arrived 
on and departed from one's shores was essential for 
survival. If exercising control over one's watery 
boundaries means the difference between life and death, 
then control will become an important feature of that form 
of life. It is also likely that certain habits will be 
encouraged, habits like disciplining one's thoughts and 
emotions, pursuing one's interests, deliberately formulating 
a plan of life, and sticking to it. But "control" may come 
at the cost of other habits, such as "release," including the 
capacity to express emotion, sacrifice one's own desires, 
put the physical and spiritual needs of the vulnerable above 
one's own. Informal observation of the world tells me that 
the first set of traits is typically found in certain individuals 
(e.g., male anglophile academics), and not in others (e.g., 
female conservative Christians), and more commonly 
found in certain communities (e.g., secular institutions of 
higher learning in western Europe and North America), 
and not in others (e.g., loosely-knit networks of Iranian 
women friends). This is not surprising, of course. The 
first set of virtues are those conducive to the sustenance of 
certain forms of life, and the second set are those conducive 
to the sustenance of other forms of life. We should not 
fault one for not being the other. 
31 It is also to employ the sort of gendered language 
feminists have taught us to recognize as rhetorical in the worst 
sense. It is the worst because it sounds benign even as it 
carries powerful political import. Its use has long been the 
most subtle and effective tool with which one group (often 
composed primarily but not exclusively ofmen) has, wittingly 
or unwittingly, marginalized the moral experiences and 
languages of other groups (often composed largely but not 
exclusively of women). To continue to pursue such ways of 
speaking is not profitable for those of us trying to listen "with 
a different ear" to "the different voices" not only of women 
but also of all those historically excluded from the moral 
philosophers' games. I take the phrases from Gilligan and 
Claudia Card, the latter of whom has written that "It is 
important to listen to women with a dijferenJ ear, not simply 
to listen for a dijferenJ voice in women." Card, "Women's 
Voices," p. 134. 
32In addition to the commentators whose responses follow, 
I have profited from the criticisms of Ned Hettinger, Peter 
List, Phil Quinn, Richard Noland, and Harry Frankfurt. I 
discussed the paper with colleagues in the Philosophy 
Departments at Oregon State University and Western Illinois 
University; read it at the Society for the Study of Ethics and 
Animals at the 1990 Pacific Division Meeting; and read it 
again at a conference on animal rights at San Francisco State 
University in April, 1990. 
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Response: 
Comstock on Autonomy 
Leslie P. Francis 
University of Utah 
There are many things to say about Comstock's 
paper. I want to comment on two issues: the role of 
"line drawing about autonomy" in the discussion ofour 
treatment of animals and the conclusion that fuller 
a'ltonomy might decrease the moral quality of the life 
of a caring woman such as Carrie. 
Comstock's basic point is that "autonomy is virtually 
useless as a line telling us which beings have and which 
beings do not have moral standing." The bulk of his 
paper is devoted to an argument that autonomy is not 
always part of a good life for human beings. aimed to 
show that a line drawn in terms of autonomy between 
humans and nonhumans is at best very fuzzy, But what 
is the relevance of this strategy to conclusions we might 
draw about our treatment of animals? 
Comstock's strategy is directed to an argument for 
differential treatment of humans and nonhumans which 
goes like this. Defenders of the differential treatment 
of humans and nonhumans rely on showing that humans 
and nonhumans have different moral statuses. One 
method of showing this different status is to attribute a 
property to humans that nonhumans lack. Autonomy 
is the property used by Frey to draw this line. But if 
the line cannot be drawn, because autonomy is not of 
value to all humans, then we cannot show that humans 
and nonhumans have different moral statuses and thus 
that it is permissible to treat them differently. 
But there are crucial gaps in Comstock's strategy. 
First, even if we grant that increased autonomy would 
not be good for all humans, it does not follow that 
autonomy is irrelevant to how we ought to treat them. 
Second, there are many ways to defend differential 
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